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Abstract
Declining fertility and increasing life expectancy put pressure on the financing of social
security in developed countries. Economists and policy makers have considered options
to address this financing challenge, most of which contain reforms of the pension system.
No pension reform appears unambiguously superior: reforms typically fare good in some
dimensions, but not all. Because of trade-offs, evaluation criteria play a major role in the
selection of the preferred policy reform. Typically, analysts consider financial sustainability
of the system, evolution of output per capita and minimum income in old age. In this
paper we add one criterion, current account imbalances. Using an overlapping-generations
model calibrated for Austria with a multi-pillar pension system and an aging population,
we compare pension reforms with pay-as-you-go financing and capital-funded financing. In
contrast to a number of previous studies, the capital-funded pillar in our model contains both
a tax component and insurance against the longevity risk, both realistic. Neglecting current
accounts, we find that increases in retirement age with the current pay-as-you-go pension
system achieve a good balance between output maintenance, pension finance sustainability
and old-age anti-poverty, consistent with previous studies. Such arrangements however
increase the dependence on net foreign assets, as the need to save for consumption after
retirement is reduced. Adding a capital-funded pillar to the pension system helps achieve
(and in some cases improve on) the same goals without increasing the dependence on net
foreign assets, over the long run. Savings placed in the pension funds are indeed available
for domestic investment. As in previous studies, there are however transitional costs.
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funded pension pillar, national savings, current account
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1 Introduction
Aging of the population is a well-known and researched challenge for developed economies, as
the continuous decrease in the ratio of the working age population over retirees puts pressure
on the financing of social security. Which is the most appropriate pension reform depends on
the policy goals. Increasing the retirement age in a pay-as-you-go pension system achieves a
good balance between the goals of maintaining output growth, financial sustainability and old-
age anti-poverty1. If one also wants to avoid an increase in current account imbalances, such
a policy may no longer be optimal, a lower private saving rate triggering a higher demand of
foreign assets. Using an overlapping-generations model calibrated for Austria, we show that the
concomitant introduction of a capital-funded pension pillar avoid this drawback, over the long
run.
The three typical parametric reforms of current pay-as-you-go pension systems have different
impacts. Increasing contribution rates secures the financial sustainability of the system with an
aging population, but reduces incentives to provide labor supply and thus output growth. The
same is true for a cut pension benefits. The latter reform also may threaten old-age anti-poverty
protection. Increases of the retirement age on the other hand deliver a good balance between the
three goals, financial sustainability, output growth and anti-poverty protection (see e.g. Jaag,
Keuschnigg, and Keuschnigg, 2010).
The objective of this paper is to extent the analysis of pension arrangements when adding a
fourth policy goal, avoiding the growth of current account imbalances. The effects on the current
account and foreign assets are often overlooked and yet they have been at the heart of the policy
debate on widening global imbalances for several years leading to the 2007 financial crisis (see e.g.
OECD, 2011a). With this fourth goal, retirement age increases may not represent an optimal
compromise anymore, since the need to save for consumption after retirement is reduced and
thus the dependence on foreign assets increased. In contrast, a cut in pension benefits stimulates
private savings, improving the net foreign asset position.
To reach our objective, we extend an existing overlapping-generations model calibrated for Aus-
tria to allow for more options in pension arrangements. The basis2 has imperfect labor markets,
three skill classes and labor supply decisions along intensive and extensive margins (participation,
job search when unemployed and work hours). The pension system is financed in a pay-as-you-go
fashion, has a flat part and an earnings-related component. During their working life, households
face a changing and typically hump-shaped wage profile, as in Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987).
The instantaneous probability of dying increases with age, to replicate the age structure of the
population. Since Austria is a small country, we assume that it is open and takes the interest
rate as given.
We extend the basic model to include capital-funded pensions. While contributions in a pay-
as-you-go system are immediately used to finance pension benefits of retirees, they are stored
up in a fund for future consumption with capital-funded pensions. Pension systems with multi-
pillar systems, including capital-funded pillars, will in theory be associated with higher domestic
1In the paper, we may speak of the risk of old-age poverty in reference to the literature analyzing the distri-
butional consequences of aging and pensions. Our use of the terms is informal and loose but captures the policy
concern.
2The basic model was initially developed in Berger et al. (2009). It is routinely used for policy evaluation (e.g.
CPB and CAPP, 2013) and applied research (e.g. Keuschnigg et al., 2012).
2
savings, reducing dependence on foreign assets. The cross-country empirical analysis from Bloom,
Canning, Mansfield, and Moore (2007) confirms this expectation. They find that an increase in
life expectancy by one year in a fully-funded system increases the national savings rate by 0.4 %-
points of GDP, while the effect is close to zero or slightly negative in a pay-as-you-go system.
We follow Keuschnigg, Keuschnigg, and Jaag (2011) for an explicit modeling of the capital-
funded pillar. Contributions in a private saving fund are mandatory. The contribution rate is a
policy parameter, and defines the size of the capital-funded pillar. Savings accumulated in the
fund can be used by firms for investments and earn the standard capital market return. Because
of administrative costs, net returns on savings are however smaller than the capital market rate.
After retirement, the fund balance is converted in an annuity, received until death.
Although finding solutions becomes more complex, explicit modeling of capital-funded pensions
has benefits. To avoid the complexity, many papers do not perform such an explicit modeling
and interpret private savings as capital-funded pensions (including Kotlikoff, 1996; Boersch-
Supan, Ludwig, and Winter, 2006, and Catalán and Magud, 2012). This simplified approach
however ignores administrative costs of pension funds, a tax component which distorts household
decisions. This simplification also ignores the risk insurance properties of capital-funded pensions
against the longevity risk, when life duration is uncertain. None of these two drawbacks take
place in our model.
A final benefit of our modeling approach is the detail in labor supply decisions. In our small
open economy setting, the extent to which household savings can be invested domestically is
key in defining the trade balance, and thus net foreign asset positions. In the long run, the
domestic investment potential is determined by technology and labor supply, firms borrowing
capital on the financial market to maximize expected profits, which depends on the capital-labor
ratio. Labor supply itself is influenced by the design of the pension system through tax-benefit
links and the tax component of pension contributions (see e.g. Feldstein and Samwick, 1992; and
Disney, 2004). A model with a rich labor market representation is thus essential to quantify
labor supply, domestic investment demand and thus current account reactions.
In summary, our contribution to the literature is as follows. With the exception of Catalán
and Magud (2012), no other paper considers the impact of pension reforms on current account
imbalances. That paper however uses a simplified model with no explicit modeling of capital-
funded pensions and reduced labor supply margins (without any extensive margin), which ignores
the tax and insurance properties of capital-funded pensions and provide a less precise estimate
of domestic investment opportunities and thus current account impacts.
We start by comparing parametric reforms in a pay-as-you-go pension system. Consistent with
the rest of the literature, we find that increases in retirement age are best at balancing goals of
financial sustainability, output growth potential and old-age anti-poverty goals. However, they
also increase dependence on foreign assets, for two reasons. First, the need to save to top-up
pension income declines, reducing the availability of domestic capital. Second, later retirement
date leads to an increase in labor supply. Profit-maximizing firms in a small open economy then
increase their capital stock and demand, to keep the capital-labor ratio optimum. In our baseline
simulations, Austria would no longer be a net creditor on the international capital market, but a
net debtor. When we add a capital-funded pension pillar making up a fourth of the total pension
system and keep average pension benefits as in the status quo, we find that all four policy goals
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can be achieved over the long run. Indeed, savings accumulated in private pension funds can be
used for domestic investment, reducing the dependence on foreign assets. In our base simulations,
such a policy even improves on output growth potential, given the labor supply incentive nature
of capital-funded pensions, which are less distortive than pay-as-you-go pensions. As is standard
in the fully-funded pension literature, we also find that the introduction of a capital-funded pillar
comes with medium transition costs.
In the next section, we provide a discussion of the related literature. Section 3 describes the model
and the following section presents its calibration. In section 5, we present long-run simulation
results, while section 6 focuses on transition results. Robustness of the results are considered
with sensitivity analysis in section 7. The last section concludes.
2 Literature review
This section provides a review of the literature which is relevant for the project3. For ease of
reading, we informally split the review by topics or strand.
2.1 Pensions in Austria
With an aging population, long-term financing of the pension system is a challenge for all de-
veloped countries, in particular in Europe and Japan. The challenge is particularly large for
Austria. Along with Belgium and Germany, the European Commission considers that Austria
has relatively sound public finance management overall but states that “reforms to address rising
age-related costs will be indispensable” (p.5, European Commission, 2009). Public debt pressure
after the 2007 subprime crisis has already accelerated the implementation of pension reforms in
most OECD countries, including Austria (OECD, 2012).
Yet, more remains to be done. According to the Ageing Working Group (2012), pension, health-
care and long-term care expenditures expenditures should increase 4.8 percentage points of GDP
between 2010 and 2060. Since these projections only consider the expenditures side and ignore
financing of old-age social security expenditures, they do not take into account potential feedback
effects from revenue adjustments and underestimate the total public finance cost of aging. As
noted for instance by Buiter (1997) and Miles (1999), computable general equilibrium (CGE)
models provide more reliable evidence on the impact of demographic change on the economy.
Keuschnigg and Keuschnigg (2004) is an early CGE analysis of pension financing in Austria.
More recent studies include Jaag et al. (2010), Keuschnigg et al. (2012) as well as Sánchez-
Romero et al. (2013). The first three studies typically find that effective retirement age has to
grow by at least 8 months for every extra year in life-expectancy to prevent increasing fiscal gaps
and to preserve output per capita. The fourth study finds that 2000-2004 pension reforms go in
the right direction, but are not sufficient to ensure the long-term financial sustainability of the
welfare state.
3The review expands and builds on the survey from the grant proposal documentation, dated 5 February 2013.
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It is worth noting that none of those studies has addressed the effects on the net foreign asset
position nor the consequences of the partial introduction of a funded pillar, which is considered
in this project.
Apart from the classical pay-as-you-go pension system, there are two further notable old-age pro-
vision schemes in Austria which, in contrast, are pre-funded. The first is government subsidized
private saving for old-age (’Zukunftsvorsorge’). The other is the severance pay system funded
by contributions of the employers, although, in contrast to a prototype funded pension pillar, it
gives employees the possibility to withdraw funds before retirement4.
Despite those two policies, Austria still relies strongly on the pay-as-you-go paradigm, relative
to other countries. Figure 2.1 illustrates this by plotting the assets in pension funds as of
2009 for the OECD countries. Comparable countries that rely on funded pension pillars have
assets in pension funds that exceed 75 % (Finland) or even 100 % of GDP (Switzerland and the
Netherlands), while this figure is about 5 % for Austria.
Figure 2.1: Assets in pension funds as % of GDP in the OECD, 2009
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Source: OECD (2011b).
2.2 Capital-funded and pay-as-you-go pensions
The main difference between fully-funded (or capital-funded) pension systems and pay-as-you-go
pension systems is the use of social security contributions. In the first case, contributions are
saved and accumulated into a saving fund until the individual retires, at which point the savings
are translated into an annuity payment. In the second case, contributions of current workers are
used to pay pension payments to current retirees.
4For more details see Koman et al. (2005).
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The respective merits of fully-funded and pay-as-you-go pension systems have been considered by
a large literature. The goal in this section is not to review this literature. Instead, we summarize
the main arguments (without being comprehensive) and provide references for details.
The main benefits of fully-funded pension systems are as follows. First, contributions earn an
additional return, related to returns on capital markets. Second, under certain conditions which
are sometimes debated5, the system increases national savings, which can promote output growth
and average income. Third, the pension system is financially balanced by design, as there is no
need of reforms even under an aging population. Exposure to political risk (no reform) is thus
lower.
The main drawbacks of fully-funded pension systems are the following. First, the pension system
faces an additional risk, namely investment returns risk. Second and related to the first, the
potential benefits of a fully-funded pension system, when compared to a pay-as-you-go system,
depend in a sensitive manner on the assumption made on the returns on contributions. Part of
the question is the extent of administration costs, which we discuss below. Although the third
argument is not related to fully-funded systems themselves, it takes into account the pay-as-you-
go nature of most existing pension systems. Moving from a pay-as-you-go to a fully-funded system
comes with transition costs for current working generations, who need to pay contributions for
the pensions of current retirees and their own future retirement.
Administrative costs of capital-funded pensions can mitigate their main advantage, the fact that
they earn higher returns than a pay-as-you-go system, which yields an implicit return rate equal
to the wage sum growth rate. As written above, the benefits of capital-funded pensions are
sensitive to the net-of-costs returns. Feldstein (1997) uses for instance a real return rate to
capital of 9 % for the United States. There are reasons why this rate could be lower6. However,
even more conservative estimates concerning the return differential of about 1.5 - 3 %-points, as
presented in Sinn (2000) for Germany, should be sufficient to cover the administrative costs of
managing the public pension funds which can reduce the effective rate by up to 1 %-point.
Additional arguments are frequently used when discussing the merits of each system, but not
directly related to systems themselves. First, pension systems can distort household decisions
and reduce labor supply, and thus output, if the link between contributions and benefits is not
perfect. By design, the link is perfect with a fully-funded pension system. The link can also
be perfect in a pay-as-you-go pension system, with an appropriate design and implementation.
To remain perfect, pension reforms are needed in this system as the population ages. Labor
supply distortions are however not an inherent flaw in a pay-as-you-go system. Second, pension
systems can have a cross-section insurance role, which can increase welfare if insurance effects
are larger than moral hazard distortions. Pay-as-you-go systems are frequently implemented
with a redistribution mechanism, either between households with a different income level or
between households with different labor market history. This includes protection against old-
age poverty. While fully-funded pensions do not have such an insurance mechanism, one can
complement it with appropriate tax-and-transfers mechanisms or with an implementation of a
mixed pay-as-you-go and fully-funded system7.
5See for instance Barr and Diamond (2006) for a critical discussion of these conditions. Lindbeck and Persson
(2003) present another, neutral, angle of analysis.
6Dimson et al. (2002), for example, report a long-run mean return to equity rate of 5.1 % averaged over several
countries.
7The apparent advantage of a funded pillar becomes even smaller if households care about relative consumption
in comparison to a reference group as shown by Knell (2010) who estimates the optimal share of a funded pillar
to be at most 20 %.
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Whether a fully-funded or a pay-as-you-go system is in the end more appropriate is still debated.
One contribution of the present paper is to provide another argument in the debate. A good
illustration of the debate, as well as arguments comparing the two systems, is provided by two
successive presidential addresses at the American Economic Association meetings: Diamond
(2004) defends the current US pay-as-you-go system while Feldstein (2005) advocates a shift
towards a fully-funded system (or a mixture between pay-as-you-go and fully-funded). The
overview by Lindbeck and Persson (2003) provide a more nuanced, impartial view8.
2.3 Current account imbalances
The current account position of a country is one indicator of macroeconomic performance, among
others. In a widely-quoted speech before the 2007 subprime crisis, the former Chairman of the US
Federal Reserve Board mitigated the satisfaction one could derive from high US output growth,
good labor market indicators and low inflation with the less satisfactory large US current account
deficit (Bernanke, 2005).
Whether current account deficits are a bad thing or not is however still debated in academic and
policy analysis circles.
Lane and Pels (2012) for instance believe that the European economic crisis following the 2007
US subprime crisis is “partly attributable to the sharp increase in external imbalances across
Europe during the pre-crisis period ” (p.0), while Wyplosz (2013) believes that “the crisis was
driven by excessive domestic demand, not by exogenous losses in competitiveness and current
account deficits” (p.19).
Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti (2012) as well as Obstfeld (2012) review arguments for neglecting,
or not, current account imbalances. Both believe that there are good and bad reasons for running
a current account deficit. Among the good reasons are the optimal intertemporal allocation
of resources. There are two kinds of bad reasons. One is the domestic perspective and the
other is international. In the domestic case, a current account deficit is often a reflection of
underlying distortions, such as imperfect labor markets or inappropriate policy. In this case, a
current account deficit is not a problem in itself, but a symptom for other problems. Trying
to reduce the deficit is in itself not a policy objective, as the focus should be on reducing the
underlying distortions. Blanchard (2007) uses a simple analytical framework and arrives at
similar conclusions. In the international case, there can be reasons for policy intervention aiming
at reducing global account imbalances.
Obstfeld (2012) lists three arguments for reducing global current account imbalances. One is
sudden stops and the sharp and painful adjustments in prices that they can trigger. Another
argument is due to externalities when financial markets are incomplete. The final argument
applies to countries within a common currency area (such as the Eurozone), in case of asymmetric
shocks or adjustments. Bernanke (2005) focuses on the US current account deficit and mentions
the risk of disorderly financial market adjustments and the risk of distortions in capital allocation
or domestic policies when savings from the rest of the world are flowing in.
8There are other reviews of the literature. Barr (2002) as well as Barr and Diamond (2006) provide additional
skeptical analysis of fully-funded pension systems, while Feldstein (1997) as well as Feldstein and Liebman (2002)
defend an opposite, pro fully-funded view.
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Rose and Spiegel (2011) take a different approach. Regardless of whether current account deficits
in themselves are theoretically good or bad, they present empirical evidence that countries with
current account surpluses appear to be better insulated from global crisis.
In this project, we do not provide new arguments to sort the debate. The analysis we perform
however can be useful for each side of the debate, that is, whether current account deficits
should be a policy target or not. In the first case, we show which pension system arrangements
are most suitable to avoid an increase in current account deficits. In the second case, we show the
contribution of population aging and pension arrangements in variations of the current account,
which helps to provide a more accurate measurement of underlying domestic distortions.
2.4 Empirics on current account, aging and pensions
Several empirical studies investigate the relationship between aging, pension arrangements and
national savings. Given that not all the changes in national saving can be absorbed domestically
it should be clear that aging and aging related reforms also affect cross-country capital flows.
Kohl and O’Brien (1998) provide a survey on empirical evidence concerning aging and national
savings. Among the most relevant papers are Bailliu and Reisen (1998), Samwick (2000) and
Bloom et al. (2007). By comparison, papers which look directly at the impact on current accounts
are scarce.
The findings in Bloom et al. (2007) stem from an exhaustive cross-country panel and highlight
that the characteristic of the pension system is an important indicator on how savings behavior
is affected by aging. An increase in life expectancy by one year in a fully funded system is found
to increase the national savings rate, i.e. national savings in % of GDP, by 0.4 %-points. The
effect on national savings in a pay-as-you-go system is close to zero or even slightly negative. One
can derive the conclusion that the effect on national savings is more negative the more generous
the pension benefits are9. The interpretation is that in systems with higher replacement rates
households save less in order to supplement their pension benefits. Some countries in the covered
sample moved from a pay-as-you-go to a fully funded system. Bloom et al. (2007) uses this change
to identify the corresponding effect on the long-run national savings rates which is estimated to
be about 13 %-points. Their estimates confirm earlier results by Bailliu and Reisen (1998). Their
findings are also consistent with Samwick (2000), who finds that countries with pay-as-you-go
pension systems tend to have lower savings rate than countries with fully-funded pensions, even
without population aging.
The empirical evidence of the effect of pension reforms on the current account (or foreign assets)
are comparably scarce. Building on earlier work of Higgins (1998), Lührmann (2003) confirms
using a panel data set consisting of 141 countries over the period 1960-1997 that international
capital flows are indeed determined not only by current but also by predicted demographic
variables, hence confirming forward-looking behavior of households. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2001) investigate the determinants of net foreign asset positions and find that countries with
a larger share of older workers (and smaller share of younger workers) have a larger net foreign
asset position, consistent with the expectation that countries with an older population need to
9The observation that a pay-as-you-go system crowds out national savings goes back to Feldstein (1976).
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save more to finance consumption after retirement. Kerdrain et al. (2010) find in a recent cross-
country panel study that an increase of statutory retirement age by one year reduces the current
account balance by 0.5 % of GDP, confirming our motivation conjecture.
A related paper confirm the relevance of demographics and pension in national savings, going
beyond mere theoretical interest. Schularick and Wachtel (2014) investigate variations in national
savings in the US over the past 50 years. They find that national savings decreased from 1970 to
2010, in large part due to a fall in pension contributions. Pension savings have thus a significant
contribution in national savings variations.
2.5 Theory on current account, aging and pensions
As aging and pension reforms are issues that will play a more prominent role in the future,
the literature has used simulation models to assess the effects of aging and pension reforms on
cross-border saving for the coming decades.
Ever since the seminal work by Buiter (1981), multi-country overlapping-generations (OLG)
models have been used to help in explaining cross-country capital flows. An example is Brooks
(2003). With a multi-region model, she finds that aging initially implies that savings by baby-
boomers in Europe and North America exceed domestic investment opportunities, while it is
reversed once the baby-boomers retire and start to dissave. In this case both regions will become
net capital importers. In principle international capital flows are influenced by many factors, such
as long-term growth trends, fiscal policy and business cycle fluctuations10. In a model ignoring
these determinants, Domeij and Flodén (2006) estimate a structural OLG model with OECD
data between 1960 and 2002 and find that a significant share of changes in low-frequency capital
flows can be explained by changes in economies’ population age structure. Ferrero (2010) pursue
similar goals with a larger number of determinants and finds that differentials in productivity
growth and population aging account for most of the current account variation between the US
and (together) the rest of the G7.
An important contribution is Boersch-Supan et al. (2006). In contrast to the previous papers,
they do not only focus on pure aging but also take pension reform into account. They base their
analysis on a multi-country OLG model of the Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) style for France,
Germany, Italy and other world regions. They confirm the capital exporter/importer time pattern
predicted by Brooks (2003) and add two contributions. First, movements in aggregate national
savings are amplified if the pension system is shifted from a pure pay-as-you-go to a fully funded
system11. Second, they address the issue of imperfections of international capital mobility12.
They emphasize that closed-economy set-ups would miss quantitatively important effects. In
addition to assuming full asset market integration in the world, they check the robustness of
their results if capital was only mobile within the OECD, only within the EU or only between
France, Germany and Italy. The effect of those three countries moving to a fully funded pension
system has a sizable impact on the interest rate only for the latter two scenarios.
10Ca’ Zorzi et al. (2012) provide a summary of possible determinants.
11However, in contrast to our model they do not explicitly model a capital-funded system but simply cut pay-
as-you-go pension benefits, which are then supplemented by private savings of perfectly forward looking agents
and which they interpret as capital-funded pensions. Boersch-Supan et al. (2006) also do not consider changes in
effective retirement age.
12See also Arezki (2010), who introduces capital market imperfections in a small open economy setting by
modeling a symmetric wedge between the capital return of foreign and domestic investors.
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There are a number of papers which look at aging and pension reform in individual countries
using a small open economy assumption, as done in this study. Consider for example Huang
et al. (1997) for the United States, Beetsma et al. (2003) for the Netherlands, Keuschnigg and
Keuschnigg (2004) for Austria or Guest (2006) for Australia. Those papers however do not
address the presence of an output/current account trade-off.
A study related to Boersch-Supan et al. (2006) is Aglietta et al. (2007), who uses a world model
where Europe is covered as a single region. In contrast to Boersch-Supan et al. (2006) they
also look at an increase in the effective retirement age and actually confirm the output-current
account trade-off, although they do not discuss this finding explicitly. They consider a scenario
in which contributions are fixed and pension benefits are reduced accordingly over time on one
hand, and a phased-in increase in retirement age by five years on the other hand. In the latter
case, the yearly current account is lower by about 4 %-points of GNP in the medium run13.
Backus et al. (2014) use a simplified multi-country OLG model with a larger number of countries
and conclude that differences in demographics can account for trade balance variations between
the US and Japan.
All of the studies discussed so far consider differentials in demographics between countries, with
or without policy reforms, to account for cross-country capital flows. In comparison, there are
very few papers which analyze current account deficits impacts due to pension policy alone,
isolated from differential in demographics.
Schimmelpfennig (2000) uses a simple 2-periods OLG model to obtain analytical results, without
providing a quantitative assessment of the magnitude of the effects. He considers a reform from
a pay-as-you-go pension system towards a fully-funded system and finds that the impact on the
current account is different if individuals are forward-looking or myopic. Catalán and Magud
(2012) perform a quantitative analysis and find that different pay-as-you-go pension reforms
have different impacts on the current account and output growth, but do not explicitly model
fully-funded pensions.
3 Model
This section provides a description of the model used in simulations. We provide an overview
for the existing model14 but all details on the extension to capital-funded pensions. The ex-
tension follows Keuschnigg, Keuschnigg, and Jaag (2011), a similar but less detailed model for
Switzerland. The numerical simulations are based on a full scale model which incorporates more
institutional detail and additional margins, summarized in the end.
The overlapping-generations (OLG) model is embedded in a small open economy setting and
built on the probabilistic aging approach introduced by Grafenhofer, Jaag, Keuschnigg, and
Keuschnigg (2007), an extension of Gertler (1999) which nests different overlapping generations
structures, from Blanchard (1985) to Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). Age groups differ in their
productivities to mimic the life-cycle income profiles as well as in their mortality probabilities,
delivering realistic demographic dynamics.
13In contrast to our study however, they do not focus on a single country and do not consider any reforms
towards a funded pension pillar.
14See Berger et al. (2009) for a detailed description of the model before the extension.
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The life-cycle is divided into periods of education, prime age work and retirement. Labor supply
decisions take place along a number of margins15. First, households decide whether to participate
in the labor market or not. Second, unemployed workers need to search for a job. Third, employed
workers split hours between labor, on-the-job training and leisure. Fourth, households choose
when to retire, taking into account the incentives set by the public pension system. For ease of
understanding, we only present in the following labor supply decisions related to participation
and hours. Labor demand is determined by a representative firm that decides how much to invest
in physical capital, how many job openings to post and how many workers to lay off.
3.1 Demography and probabilistic aging
The demographic dynamics are modeled as follows. In period t the economy is inhabited by
Nt persons who differ along several characteristics, including age group (a) and skill (i). The
overlapping generations structure relies on the concept of ’Probabilistic Aging’ (see Grafenhofer
et al., 2007). There is a discrete number A of age groups16. Individuals17 age stochastically,
which means that they switch from age group a ∈ {1, ..., A} to age group a + 1 with a given
probability 1− ωa per period. If a period is a year then the expected time a person stays in age
group a is 1/(1−ωa) years. Once the last age group A is reached, the aging probability drops to
zero, i.e. ωA = 1. Life does not necessarily end in age group A as individuals face an age-group
dependent death probability 1 − γa at the end of every period. As aging occurs stochastically
two individuals in the same age group can differ by their life-cycle history α ∈ N at , where N at is
the set of all possible biographies. A biography α is simply a vector that holds the information
on the time an individual has aged from one age group to the other. The set of completely
identical people who share the same life-cycle history is denoted Na,iα,t. Aggregating over different
biographies gives the number of persons in age group a with skill i at time t
Na,it =
∑
α∈Nat
Na,iα,t. (3.1)
The skill level is fixed before people enter age group a = 1 - either exogenously or endogenously
as in the full scale model - which implies that there are no transitions between skill classes during
a life-time. The laws of motion per age-skill group are then given as
N1,it+1 = γ
1ω1N1,it +New
i
t+1, (3.2)
Na,it+1 = γ
aωaNa,it + γ
a−1(1− ωa−1)Na−1,it , (3.3)
where Newit+1 are exogenously given ’newborns’, i.e. people who attain an age that allows them
to participate in the labor market18. Because of our assumption that individuals cannot switch
between different skill classes during their lifetime, the household sector can be easily partitioned
according to the skill levels. The household problems of different skill groups do therefore not
differ except for the different parametrization. Spill-overs occur only through prices and general
equilibrium effects. We will therefore drop the skill index i when describing the household
problems to save notation, as the extension to several skill groups is straightforward. Aggregation
15For this project, we consider exogenous and constant education decisions. There exists a version of the model
with endogenous education decisions.
16In the full model specification we work with A = 8 age groups.
17We use an individualistic approach, hence the terms ’individual’ and ’household’ are used interchangeably.
18In the full model specification we interpret entering a = 1 as having an age of 15 years.
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over different characteristics can easily be done by summing up
N it+1 =
A∑
a=1
Na,it+1 and Nt+1 =
∑
i
N it+1. (3.4)
3.2 Life cycle optimization
The life cycle is partitioned into three stages defined by setting a retirement decision age group ar.
In case of 0 < a < ar individuals are in the working stage. If a = ar individuals find themselves
in the retirement decision stage, while they are in the retirement stage if ar < a ≤ A. Individuals
in groups a ≤ ar face the same decision problems concerning participation, consumption and
labor supply. Retired persons only decide how much to consume. The particularity of the
retirement decision stage is that non-participation is interpreted as retirement. Households in
the working stage optimize life-time utility subject to the laws of motion for the following three
stock variables: regular assets A, mandatory pension savings assets AF and obtained pension
rights in the pay-as-you-go part of the pension system PE . In the retirement stage a = ar the
pension fund savings AF are converted into an annuity plan, i.e. a fixed yearly gross payment,
which depends on the expected remaining life expectancy, and an exogenous yearly valorization
factor. The entitlements to a payout from the capital funded pillar are recorded in the stock
variable PF which is only applicable at a ≥ ar. Accumulated pension rights PE in the pay-as-
you-go system are also converted into payments, but without the use of an annuity formula. The
dynamics of the pension related stock variables are discussed in detail in section 3.4. Using an
actuarially fair reverse-life insurance (see Blanchard, 1985) the evolution of regular assets, i.e.
the inter-temporal budget constraint, is given by
GγaAaα,t+1 = Rt+1Sav
a
α,t, with Sav
a
α,t ≡
[
Aaα,t + y
a
α,t − Caα,t
]
, (3.5)
where G is an exogenous productivity growth factor by which the model is detrended. Income
flow yaα,t is explained in the consecutive sections, Caα,t denotes household consumption, while
R > 1 is the interest factor. Individuals have preferences according to the following Epstein-Zin
specification19
V aα,t = max
[(
Qaα,t
)ρ
+ γaβ
(
GωaV aα,t+1 +G(1− ωa)V a+1α′,t+1
)ρ]1/ρ
. (3.6)
Individuals in age groups a ≤ ar maximize utility with respect to participation δaα,t, hours worked
laα,t and consumption Caα,t. The effort-adjusted consumption is given as Qaα,t = Caα,t−ϕal
(
laα,t
)−
ϕaδ
(
δaα,t
)
, where the effort costs functions ϕal (·) and ϕaδ (·) are convexly increasing. Households in
the retirement stage a = ar in principle face the same decision problems, with the only differences
that non-participation is interpreted as retirement and that households are entitled to pension
payments based on past earnings instead of exogenous non-participation benefits20. Retired
workers just decide about optimal consumption, hence Qaα,t = Caα,t, ∀a > ar. The resulting
optimal consumption-savings decision is governed by a typical Euler-equation
(
Qaα,t
)ρ−1
= βRt+1η¯
a
α,t+1G
ρ−1, (3.7)
19The elasticity of intertemporal substitution is 1/(1− ρ) while individuals are risk-neutral. See Farmer (1990)
and Weil (1990) for details.
20In line with evidence and theories of retirement bunching (Hurd, 1990; French, 2005), we also assume that
households within the same skill-class make a collective retirement decision (that is, choose the same retirement
date).
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where η¯at+1 ≡ ωa ∂V
a
α,t+1
∂Aaα,t+1
+ (1− ωa) ∂V
a+1
α,t+1
∂Aa+1α,t+1
is the shadow price of a marginal increase in assets,
taking aging into account.
3.3 Labor market
The per-period income flow yaα,t depends on age in the following form:
yaα,t =

δaα,t · (1− τat ) · yaα,t,par +
(
1− δaα,t
) · yat,npar if a < ar,
δaα,t · (1− τat ) · yaα,t,par +
(
1− δaα,t
) · yaα,t,pens if a = ar,
yaα,t,pens if a > ar.
(3.8)
where yat,npar is the net value of non-participating, such as home production and simple welfare
benefits. The value of participating yaα,t,par = laα,t · θa · wt depends on labor supply laα,t, an age
dependent productivity parameter θa and the wage rate wt. The second line emphasizes how δaα,t
captures the retirement decision when a = ar. The after-tax pension payout is given as follows
and consists of three parts (or three pillars):
yaα,t,pens = (1− τat )
[
P0 + ν
aPE,aα,t + P
F,a
α,t
]
.
The first part P0 is an exogenous flat part. The second part νaPE,a is the entitlement to a pay-
as-you-go pension payment, where the conversion factor νa translates earned pension rights PE,aα,t
into actual payments. The third part is the annuity payment that stems from the mandatory
savings in the capital-funded pension pillar. The accumulation of the last two pillars is described
in more detail in the next section.
3.4 Pension pillars
During their working life, individuals build up their pay-as-you-go pension rights PE,aα,t with labor
market income21, according to:
GPE,aα,t+1 = R
P,a
[
δaα,tm
a
t y
a
α,t,par + σ
P · PE,aα,t
]
if a < ar,
GPE,aα,t+1 = R
P,a
[
σP (δaα,t)m
a
t y
a
α,t,par + σ
P (δaα,t) · PE,aα,t
]
if a = ar,
GPE,aα,t+1 = R
P,aPE,aα,t if a > ar.
An accumulation factor ma converts the individual income into an increase in the pension rights,
and therefore an increase in the actual payment after retirement. The factor σP allows to give
earlier incomes a lower weight for the computation of the pension. The index factor RP,a can
either be set to imply price indexation of pension (RP,a = 1), wage indexation (RP,a = G) or a
mixture. If aging from one to the next age-group occurs, pension rights are simply brought along,
i.e. P a+1,Eα′,t+1 = P
a,E
α,t+1. In the retirement stage, the individuals are subject to ’corridor’ pension
incentives, measured by the function σP (δaα,t) = σP + σP1 (δaα,t − δPt ). Postponed retirement
beyond the statutory retirement age δPt leads to a larger increase in the pension payment, and
21The full model is flexible enough to allow contributions from employed income, unemployed income and/or
time of participation alone, independent of earnings.
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vice-versa. Whenever individuals retire earlier than the statutory retirement age, they encounter
a financial penalty. The strength is parametrized by σP1 .
Note that the pay-as-you-go payout is not directly related to the social security contribution
rate nor to life-expectancy. The parameters of this pension pillar and the contribution rates
can obviously be set such that this part of the pension system breaks even. There is however no
automatism and underlying changes in the demographic structure towards an older society, while
keeping the parameters of the system constant, are bound to lead to a deficit in the pay-as-you-go
system. The capital-funded pillar works quite differently. The asset stock is directly related to
the contributions that have been made over the life-time. When an individual retires the asset
stock is converted into an annuity plan based on life expectancy.
GγaAFα,t+1 = R
F
[(
tF,at + t
F,F,a
t
)
δaα,ty
a
α,t,par +A
F,a
α,t
]
if a < ar,
PF,aα′,t =
1
µF,at
·AF,aα′,t if switch to aris at t,
GPF,aα,t+1 = R
F,a
[
σF
(
δaα,t
)
/γa ·
((
tF,at + t
F,F,a
t
)
yaα,t,par + P
F,a
α,t
)]
if a = ar,
+RPF,aPF,aα,t
GPF,aα,t+1 = R
PF,aPF,aα,t if a > ar.
During their working life, the worker (tF,at ) and the firm (t
F,F,a
t ) contribute to the capital-funded
pillar. Note that the workers’ contribution rate is part of their total tax wedge τa. The return
to mandatory pension savings is the market rate minus administration costs, i.e. RF = R− ρF .
The factor RPF,a is simply an exogenous indexation factor by which the capital-funded pension
payout grows every year. After the working phase, saved assets are transformed into the annuity
using the annuitization factor µF,a. The following result is useful for finding the numerical
solution:
Lemma 1. The annuitization factor is given as
a < aR : µF,at = 1
a = aR : µF,at = 1− δaα,t +
(
γaRPF,a + σF (δaα)R
F,a
t+1
) µ¯F,at+1
Ωat+1R
F,a
t+1
a > aR : µF,at = 1 +
(
γaRPF,a
) µ¯F,at+1
Ωat+1R
F,a
t+1
∀a : µ¯F,at+1 = ωaµF,at+1 + (1− ωa)
(
Λaα,t+1
)1−ρ
µF,a+1t+1
a = aR : σF (δaα) = δ
a
α,t
Ωat+1
µ¯F,at+1
.
Proof. The proof is provided in Keuschnigg et al. (2011).
Ω and Λ are terms related to the marginal propensity of substitution between groups, explained
in details in Berger et al. (2009). The annuitization factor µF is forward looking and depends
positively on all future survival rates γa as well as all future indexation factors RPF,a, as the
recursive representation shows. The higher these variables, the lower the stream of pension
payouts out of the mandatory savings stock. This is consistent with intuition, as one expects
that a larger life expectancy reduces the annuity, ceteris paribus. Keuschnigg, Keuschnigg, and
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Jaag (2011) present details on the working incentives effects of all three pension pillars. The
contribution rate to fund flat pay-as-you-go pensions is naturally perceived as a tax, while the
effective tax component in a system with a strong earnings-benefits link, or a corridor pension,
can be greatly reduced. A funded system can in principle be neutral with respect to the labor
market decisions of the workers if the return is that of the market, RF = R. As we assume that
the capital-funded pillar comes with administration costs, i.e. RF > R, the funded system is
distortive as well. In principle, a pay-as-you-go system can also be designed in a way to have
little distortions on households’ labor market decisions, similar to a capital-funded system. As
the names suggest, the fundamental difference is that the latter involves the accumulation of
actual assets usable in production, with its consequences on asset returns in goods terms, while
the former only has notional (accounting) accumulation, without any returns in goods terms.
3.5 Production
Production is carried out by a competitive representative firm taking input prices, i.e. wage
rates, the interest rate and the price of the output good, which serves as numeraire, as given.
Production is subject to capital adjustment costs, a standard feature of computable OLG models.
In this presentation wage rates are determined in skill-dependent perfect labor markets. The full
model features unemployment and wage setting through bargaining. The production function is
linear homogenous:
Yt = F
Y
(
Kt, L
D,i=1
t , L
D,i=2
t , L
D,i=3
t
)
. (3.9)
The labor inputs LD,it from different skill classes are not perfect substitutes. We assume that
high skill labor and capital are more complementary than low skill labor and capital and use
a nested CES-specification from Jaag (2009). The firm maximizes its end of period value V F ,
which equals the stream of discounted dividend payments χ:
V (Kt) = max
It,L
D,i
t
[
χt +
GV (Kt+1)
Rt+1
]
,
s.t. χt = Yt − It − J (It,Kt)−
∑
i
(1 + tF,F,a)witL
D,i
t , (3.10)
GKt+1 =
(
1− δK)Kt + It,
where J (·) denotes the adjustment costs, which are homogenous of degree one as in Hayashi
(1982). Labor demands are pinned down by the marginal products and the labor costs consisting
of wage and contribution rates, i.e. YLD,i = (1 + tF,F,a)wi. The firm value V , based on optimal
firm decisions, is a part of asset demand.
3.6 Aggregation
So far decision problems have been set up for the smallest set of identical households, i.e. house-
holds of the same age and skill, at the same time sharing the same history concerning the
stochastic aging process. As shown in Grafenhofer et al. (2007) aggregation can be performed
under certain assumptions such that the model can be analyzed at the age and skill class level,
without distinguishing between different biographies α. The assumptions are separability of con-
sumption and leisure in the utility function, a collective retirement decision within an age-skill
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class and income pooling within an age-skill class. With income pooling, the probability of par-
ticipation is equivalent to the share of a representative household which participates in the labor
market. Labor market decisions of the households are thus independent of their current asset
position and are simply determined by current observables, including wages, tax rates as well
as forward looking shadow prices. As all of those determinants are independent of biographies,
households in the same age and skill class make the same labor market decisions, i.e. δat = δaα,t
and lat = laα,t.
The aggregation of a variable X simply sums up over all biographies and weights with the relative
population shares
Xa,it =
∑
α∈Nat
Xa,iα,t ·Na,iα,t. (3.11)
For example, total private consumption per age-skill group is given by Ca,it =
∑
α C
a,i
α,t · Na,iα,t.
Effective labor supply LS takes both labor supply margins and productivity into account, LS,a,it =∑
α δ
a,i
α,t · la,iα,t ·θa ·Na,iα,t. While aggregation of static relationships, like the first order conditions for
labor supply and participation, is simple it becomes more involved for the difference equations for
private and mandatory assets or pension points, given the dependence of stocks on biographies.
One obtains the following result:
Lemma 2. Asset aggregation for private and mandatory assets.
GAa,it+1 = Rt+1
[
ωaSava,it +
(
1− ωa−1)Sava−1,it ] , Sava,it ≡ [Aa,it + ya,it Na,it − Ca,it ] .
∀a : AF,at+1 = ωaRF,at+1
[
AF,at + x
a
t T
F,a
t − (1− xat )PX,at
]
+(
1− ωa−1)RF,a−1t+1 [AF,a−1t + xa−1t TF,a−1t − (1− xa−1t )PX,a−1t ]
a > aR : xat = 0
TF,at = 0
PX,aα,t = P
F,a
α,t P
X,a
t =
∑
α
Naα,tP
X,a
α,t
a = aR : xat = δ
a
t
TF,aα,t =
(
tF,at + t
F,F,a
t
)
yaα,t,par T
F,a
t =
∑
α
Naα,tT
F,a
α,t
PX,aα,t = P
F,a
α,t P
X,a
t =
∑
α
Naα,tP
X,a
α,t
a < aR : xat = δ
a
t
TF,aα,t =
(
tF,at + t
F,F,a
t
)
yaα,t,par T
F,a
t =
∑
α
Naα,tT
F,a
α,t
PX,aα,t = 0 P
X,a
t =
∑
α
Naα,tP
X,a
α,t = 0
Proof. extension of Grafenhofer et al. (2007).
Berger et al. (2009) contains similar aggregation results for other stocks, human capital, pay-as-
you-go pension rights and household savings. Aggregation over age groups or skill classes is done
by simply summing up, i.e. Xt =
∑
a,iX
a,i
t . For example, effective labor supply by skill class is
given by LS,it =
∑
a L
S,a,i
t .
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3.7 Market clearing and government budget
The asset market is central to the understanding of the results of this paper. First, we assume
that all assets are perfect substitutes. Total private household assets (A) and pension funds (AF )
are invested in the domestic representative firm (V ), government debt (DG) and foreign assets
(DF ). Hence, the asset market clearing condition can be written as
At +A
F
t = Vt +D
G
t +D
F
t (3.12)
Given the small open economy assumption with a fixed real interest rate, foreign assets DF , and
thus the current account, simply adjust to clear the asset market. In our simulations, government
debt is kept constant by balancing the government budget in every period. In this case, a pension
reform can influence foreign assets in three ways: (a) by changing the private savings behavior
of the households, through A, (b) by changing mandatory savings rules, through AF or (c) by
changing the domestic investment opportunities, through V . As in Berger et al. (2009) and
following Hayashi (1982), one can show that the value of the representative firm is directly
related to the capital stock, V = tob ·K, where tob is Tobin’s q. Given the constant user costs
of capital, the capital stock K and thus the domestic investment opportunities V are in the long
run determined by effective labor supply. This illustrates the importance of modeling precisely
labor market decisions to quantify the impact of pension reforms on the current account.
The clearing of the labor market has been described in previous sections. By Walras’ Law, the
goods market clears when the two other markets, for asset and labor, clear. It is instructional
however to state the goods market clearing condition:
Yt = Ct + It +Gt + TBt,
where Gt is government expenditure and TBt is the trade balance, which affects the evolution
of foreign assets in the following way:
DFt+1 = Rt+1
(
DFt + TBt
)
.
3.8 Full scale model
Numerical simulations are performed with a full scale computational model with features unre-
lated to capital-funded pensions and not described in the simple presentation above, for simplic-
ity. Those features are not important for understanding qualitative mechanisms but improve the
quantitative predictions of the model.
We now briefly list the additional features. A detailed description of the full model without
capital-funded pensions is provided in Berger et al. (2009). First, there is an additional labor
market margin, namely unemployment. The probability of finding a job depends on the search
effort of workers and the amount of vacancies created by the firm, in a static search-and-matching
framework derived from Boone and Bovenberg (2002). Second, to match the observed distribu-
tion of consumption over the life-cycle, the model incorporates a warm-glow motive. Inter-vivo
transfers take place from the older to the younger age groups within a skill class. Third, as the
pathway to retirement via the disability pension system is quantitatively important in Austria,
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the full scale model incorporate disability shocks and insurance. Since entitlement to a disability
pension follows an exogenous shock, the pension reforms that we consider exclude adjustments
or changes of the disability pension system. Fourth, the full model has a complete institutional
setting on taxation and transfers to individuals and firms. In particular, we make a difference
between a general budget and a social security budget, the latter paying for pensions, unem-
ployment benefits, disability benefits and health insurance and being financed by social security
contributions of employers and employees. Health insurance costs are exogenously defined, with
a constant age-dependent spending per capita. The general budget is financed by income, con-
sumption and corporate taxes and is used to cover own government expenditures, the deficit of
the social security system, firm and household subsidies and interests on government debt.
For a better understanding of the effect of aging and pension arrangements on savings behavior
and foreign assets, we do not use all capacity of the full scale model. We consider exogenous
human capital, on-the-job training and retirement decisions. The first two decisions remain
constant, while the latter is changed via policy reforms.
4 Calibration
This section describes the calibration of the model for Austria, using 2013 as the basis year. In
the parametrization we choose the number of age-groups to be A = 8 and the three different
skill-groups (low, medium, high) resulting in a total of 24 representative households. Low skill is
any level below upper secondary (ISCED 0-2), that is individuals without ’Matura’ in Austria.
Medium skilled individuals have an upper secondary education degree (ISCED 3-4) and high
skilled have an academic degree (ISCED 5-6). Calibration of the household sector of the model,
including productivity and labor disutility parameters, is made by fitting model predictions
with the conditional first moments for representative households in recent pooled microdata, in
particular the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and the Community Statistics on Income and Living
Conditions (EU-SILC). The calibration of the macro aggregates is based on national accounts
information, while the behavioral elasticities are chosen in accordance with standards from the
literature.
Berger et al. (2009) provide a detailed description of the calibration procedure, which we follow
with some exceptions. We describe exceptions in the continuation. First, the basis year is 2013
instead of 2009. Second, as long run real interest rate we set r = 0.025 which is crucial for the
savings behavior and therefore for one of the main variables of interest, namely foreign assets.
We will address these concerns by running sensitivity test of the results with respect to different
choices of the subjective discount factor β in section 7.
The third and fourth differences relate to the capital-funded pillar and deserve a detailed discus-
sion. In the third difference, there are some extra parameters which have to be set simply because
of the introduction of the capital-funded pillar. The administrative costs of running the pillar are
set to 10% of the real return, i.e. rF = 0.025 × 0.9 = 0.0225. The indexation of capital-funded
pension payouts is assumed to be the same as for the earnings-related PAYG pension payouts. As
a fourth difference, we chose an alternative calibration strategy for the time discount factor than
Berger et al. (2009). A fundamental problem when calibrating an equilibrium model is that the
economy currently observed is not in a steady state. This is a particular problem for the foreign
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assets and the current account. In equilibrium both are related by the steady-state relationship
TB = −r/(1 + r)DF , where DF are foreign assets and TB is the trade balance. Hence, a trade
surplus in the long run is only consistent with negative foreign assets. Equivalently a country
can permanently run a trade deficit only if it accumulated positive foreign assets before. The
observed trade balance is therefore very likely a temporary phenomenon as Austria generated
current account22 surpluses in the recent past will having a positive net foreign asset position23.
Calibrations that replicate the current trade balance as an equilibrium outcome therefore have
to assume a considerably different underlying savings behavior than actually observed. Hence,
modelers face a clear trade-off: either replicate the current trade balance but fail to replicate
the actual savings behavior (as parametrized by the discount factor β) or replicate the savings
behavior but fail to replicate the current trade balance. We argue that for the question to be
answered, capturing the savings behavior as well as possible is of primary importance. Our
calibration therefore falls short of generating a realistic initial trade balance as well as foreign
assets stock, which is why we only interpret the changes in these variables in our simulations.
In section 7 we elaborate on this choice further by comparing the simulation results for different
calibration values for the discount factor. In our benchmark calibration we use β = 0.99.
The final point worth mentioning is a related problem, namely the calibration of the model
to an initial demographic distribution when the observed current demographic structure is not
stationary. This is illustrated in figure 4.1. Again one faces a trade off. On one hand one can use
the currently observed age-dependent mortality rates which in steady state would lead to an older
population than currently observed. On the other hand one could match the current demographic
structure by lowering the mortality rates, which however implies a lower life expectancy than
actually faced by the current population. We address this by compromising between both targets.
The fit of the model with the demographic data in 2013 and 2060 (based on the medium scenario
projection of the Austrian Statistical Office, Statistik Austria) is illustrated in figure 4.2.
Figure 4.1: Projection, Austria, relative sizes of age groups as share of total +15 population
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Source: Statistik Austria, medium population projection.
22As we have only one good in our model and therefore no services trade the meaning of current account and
trade balance coincide.
23In the data compiled in the World Development Indicators from the World Bank, Austria had a net foreign
assets position equal to 71% of GDP in 2013, and an external balance on goods and services equal to 3.6% of
GDP.
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Figure 4.2: Absolute population size per age groups in Austria for 2013 and 2060
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Note: Populations of the 15+ year old is normalized to 100 in 2013.
Source: Statistik Austria and simulation results.
5 Long run simulations
In this section we consider long run simulation results by reporting the results of different shocks
and reforms on the final steady states. This gives a good understanding of the underlying mech-
anisms. As we will show in the next section, it is also quantitatively close to results for 2070
onward. In total we present nine simulations, whose results are shown in table 2. First, we
present the benchmark aging scenario. We then have a look on the effects of four standard para-
metric pay-as-you-go pension reforms. We then introduce a capital-funded pillar and compare
it to a pay-as-you-go benchmark. We finish with two combinations of capital-funded pillar and
parametric pension reforms.
We will compare outcomes along four policy criteria: fiscal sustainability, output per capita,
pension payout generosity and foreign asset position. The overall aim is to find a policy reform
mix with the best balance along these four dimensions. Table 1 provides a schematic summary
of the effects of pension reforms (lines) along the four evaluation dimensions (columns). For
instance, an increase in retirement age in a pure pay-as-you-go system improves the output
growth potential (compared to the status quo with population aging) but decreases the net
foreign asset position. The following informal statement provides a preview of the main results:
Summary finding 1: Over the long run, parametric pension reforms in a pure pay-as-you-go
system improve financial sustainability but either penalize output growth (pension cuts, contri-
bution increase), increase risk of old-age poverty (pension cuts) or increase the dependence on
foreign assets (retirement age increase); with the introduction of a capital-funded pension pillar
combined with a small pension cut and an increase in retirement age, all four policy goals can
be achieved: financial sustainability, output growth maintenance, low old-age poverty risk and no
dependence on foreign assets.
We provide details on results and a discussion in the remainder of the section.
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Table 1: Summary findings long-run simulations
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Pension cuts in pure PAYG + - - +
Contribution increase in pure PAYG + - = +
Later retirement in pure PAYG + + = -
Capital-funded pillar introduction - + + +
Pension cut + Later retirement +
Capital-funded pillar introduction
+ + = +
Note: effects are compared to the no-reform status quo under population aging.
5.1 Population aging benchmark
Column (1) of table 2 gives the long run impact of the population aging shock, without any
policy reforms. These results provide a benchmark to identify the impact of reforms considered
in the other simulations.
Mortality rates and the number of newborns are adjusted in order to match the projected de-
mographic change and kept constant after 2075. In the final steady state the population older
than 15 years is 112% of what it was in 2013. As the retirement age is kept constant, population
aging leads to a relative drop in labor supply: yearly hours per capita drop from 897 in 2013 to
769 in the long run. The capital stock adjusts by shrinking accordingly, which leads to a 13%
drop in GDP per capita (compared to the productivity growth trend). Pension expenditures
increase from 14 to 22% of GDP, although pension expenditure per recipient shrinks 4% due
to population aging, declining participation over the life-cycle and the link of earnings during
working time and the pension payouts24. The public finance challenge is illustrated by a rise of
the social security deficit from 3.6 to 15.7% of GDP.
24The labor market participation rate declines over the life-cycle. Because the population ages and the retire-
ment age is constant, the average age of workers increases. The average participation thus declines. Lifelong
labor income thus also decline. Because of the 2nd pillar of the pension system, earnings-related, average pension
payments decline.
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Table 2: Long-run results
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Gross domestic product in 2013 is 112. Pension expenditures per retiree, GDP per capita, Private and
Government Consumption figures are all deviations from the productivity growth trend.
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In reality, the magnitude of the public finance challenge is however even larger than indicated
by these figures, for two reasons. First, the deficit in the social security system is financed by
the general budget, which creates a gap. The gap is even increased, as revenue from income
and consumption tax per capita decrease. To close the government budget gap, we assume
that government reduces its own expenditures (in other words, government consumption is the
budget closing instrument). Note that government consumption in our specification excludes
education and health costs, which we keep constant in per age and per capita terms. The overall
fiscal consequence of pure aging is that government consumption has to drop by 115%, which
would clearly not be feasible in reality. Closing with government consumption is also related
to the second reason why the fiscal consequences of aging are underestimated. Government
consumption is non-productive in the model and therefore non-distortive (similar to lump-sum
taxes). If we used realistic financing instruments and closed the budget with a distortive tax,
e.g. income taxes, relative labor supply would drop even further and the tax base would shrink,
increasing the challenge of financing old-age social security.
In terms of foreign debt the effect of aging is not very pronounced. In the long run the foreign
asset stock would increase by less than 8% in terms of initial GDP. The increase in net foreign
assets is due to the declining domestic investment opportunities, as the firms’ capital stock drops.
5.2 Parametric pay-as-you-go pension reforms
We now look at the effect of three typical parametric pension reforms: an increase in retirement
age by either 2 years (column 2) or six years (column 3), a cut in pensions by reducing the payout
factor νa by 20% (column 4) and an increase in the workers social security contribution rate by
6.5 pp (column 5). Reforms in columns (2), (4) and (5) were set such that all of them reduce
the social security deficit from 15.7% of GDP in the benchmark aging scenario to about 13.2%
of GDP. The reform in column (3) is later used as comparison point in future simulations. Since
its impacts are the same as in column (2) but larger, we do not discuss it.
Out of the three reform options the increase in retirement age (column 2) performs best in
terms of GDP per capita, as the drop can be reduced to -8% instead of -13% in the benchmark
aging scenario. The same conclusion holds for the effect on private and public consumption.
Although the social security deficit is comparable in all three reform options, the lower drop
in government consumption under retirement age increase indicates higher improvements in
financial sustainability. Not surprisingly, the pension cut reform (column 4) increases most the
risk of old-age poverty, the average pension expenditure per retiree dropping almost 16%. These
outcomes are consistent with the existing literature.
The last and novel evaluation criteria is the current account impact, or, equivalently, the net for-
eign asset position. The effects on foreign assets differ considerably between the three measures.
The foreign asset stock increases most in case of a rise in the contribution rates (column 5). Be-
cause the provision of labor supply is discouraged, the capital stock shrinks more, which has an
effect on the domestic investment opportunities (as confirmed by the drop in the firm value V F ).
This is the main explanation for the increase in foreign assets, as domestic households simply
ship their investment abroad due to the lack of domestic opportunities. In case of a pension cut
(column 4), foreign assets increase for two reasons. First, because of the pension-earnings link
a cut in pension benefits has a discouraging effect on labor supply with similar consequences on
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the firm value as in the case of a contribution increase, though quantitatively less pronounced. In
addition households change their savings behavior. In order to compensate for the loss in public
pensions and finance consumption after retirement, they increase their private savings over their
life time which leads to higher asset supply (as confirmed by the larger increase in asset positions
A). Given the reduced domestic investment opportunities this extra saving is invested abroad.
In the case of an increase of the retirement age by 2 years (column 2), the effect on foreign assets
is reversed, as the position decreases. The explanation is that labor supply, production and firm
value rise compared to the pure aging scenario such that asset holdings abroad are shifted to the
local firm. The drop in foreign assets amounts to less than 30% of initial GDP. However, if the
increase in retirement age is 6 instead of 2 years, as in column (3), which implies an effective
retirement age of about 65 years (i.e. the current statutory retirement age), the drop in foreign
assets is larger than one time the initial GDP. Since the net asset position in 2013 was positive
at 71% of GDP, an increase of the effective retirement age to its statutory level would transform
Austria from a net creditor into a net asset debtor on the international capital market. The
impact is thus large and justifies policy attention.
5.3 Capital-funded pillar
In this section we consider two reforms. The first is the introduction of a capital-funded pillar
into the existing pay-as-you-go system (column 7). The second is a reform of the current pay-
as-you-go system so that it mimics some properties of capital-funded pensions, for comparison
purposes (column 6).
We consider the introduction of a capital-funded pillar so that pension expenditures (payouts)
in this pillar amount to approximately one fourth of total pension expenditures (column 7). In
order to do so, we shift 3.8 pp of the current contribution rates of workers and firms from the pay-
as-you-go pillars to the capital-funded pillar, keeping the total burden on labor identical. We also
reduce in equivalent proportion the accumulation factor for pension rights in the earnings-related
pay-as-you-go pillar.
For comparison purposes, we perform a reform of the pure pay-as-you-go pension system in order
to mimic some of the properties of a system with a capital-funded pillar (column 6). One core
difference between a pay-as-you-go pension system and a capital-funded system are the returns
on contributions (more specifically, on accumulated contributions in mandatory savings) in the
second system. Another core difference is that contributions and benefit payouts are balanced
(for the average life expectation) under capital-funded pensions, while they are not necessarily
balanced with pay-as-you-go pensions. In the latter case, even if contributions and payouts are
balanced at some point in time, they become unbalanced if the population ages and there are
no reforms25. To disentangle the effects from these two differences due to the introduction of
a capital-funded pillar, the simulation (6) changes the contribution rates of the pay-as-you-go
system (in a skill-dependent fashion) such that the balance between contributions and payouts
in the pay-as-you-go pillars are equivalent in reforms (6) and (7)26. This allows to assess the
effect of the returns on contributions alone, comparing outcomes of reforms (6) and (7).
25These two core differences also lead to differences in labor supply incentives.
26Specifically, we use (payouts - lifetime contributions)/payouts as a measure of the balance of the pay-as-you-go
pension pillars, where both payouts and contributions refer to the pay-as-you-go pillars only. With aging and no
reform, the measure is 0.50 for the average household (benchmark scenario 1). In reform (7), the pay-as-you-go
pillars are only 26% of the total pension expenditures (over all 3 pillars), so we increase contribution rates in
reform (6) such that the balance measure equals (0.74 x payouts - lifetime contributions)/0.74 x payouts, or 0.32.
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We discuss the introduction of a capital funded pillar first (column 7). Even if workers officially
face the same total contribution rates, the reform has an effect on labor supply, as contributions
to a capital-funded pillar have a lower tax component (see discussion above): yearly hours per
capita rise from 769 in the benchmark aging scenario to 784. Because of the earnings link in
the pay-as-you-go pension pillars, the payout from these pillars also increases, explaining why
average pension payouts are higher. The risk of old-age poverty thus declines27. Because of the
labor supply incentives, output per capita is larger than in the benchmark aging case, declining
only 12% instead of 13%. Net foreign assets also increase more than in the benchmark case.
The reason is that total savings, the sum of private and mandatory savings, is stimulated by the
introduction of the capital-funded pillar: contributions to this pillar are not longer consumed but
saved. Together they increase by about 1.3 times of initial GDP, which is larger than the increase
in domestic investment opportunities created by the increase in labor supply, as indicated in the
firms value V F increase. Hence, part of the total savings increase is invested abroad. While
the reform fare well on the output growth, protection against old-age poverty and foreign assets
criteria, it is not as successful as other reforms along the financial sustainability criterion. Unlike
other reforms, it is not successful in reducing the social security deficit, unchanged at 15.7% of
GDP. Although the relative size of the pay-as-you-go pension pillars decline (from 100% to 74%),
their absolute size increase (24 instead of 22% of GDP), following the rise in average payouts.
The financing unbalance of these pillars is not corrected.
We next compare outcomes with the reform of the pure pay-as-you-go pension system (column
6) so that it mimics the balance properties of the capital-funded pillar system (column 7). Labor
supply incentives in the mimicking case (6) are significantly worse than in the capital-funded
case (7), yearly hours per capita dropping to 734 instead of 784. Reasons are similar as for
reform (5). The bigger drop of output growth per capita is a natural consequence, as well
as the drop in domestic investment opportunities and the larger increase in net foreign assets.
The only favorable outcome of the mimicking case concerns financial sustainability, along several
dimensions. For instance, the deficit of the pay-as-you-go pension system is 8.2% of GDP, instead
of 8.6%. This outcome is due to the fact that reform (7) only moves partially to a fully-funded
system, to the earnings-related component of the pay-as-you-go pillar and to the labor supply
incentive of the reform (see above). The general message from this comparison is that (some)
outcomes can be improved when one introduces a partial capital-funded pillar if one considers at
the same time some parametric reforms of the pay-as-you-go system. This strategy will be used
in the next section.
5.4 Capital-funded pillar and retirement age increase
In the last pair of simulations we combine the introduction of the capital-funded system with
the increase of the retirement by 6 years (columns 8 and 9). On top of this, we cut pay-as-you-
go pensions28 such that generosity is comparable to the benchmark aging scenario, in the last
simulation (column 9). Because effects are cumulative and the last simulation delivers the best
outcomes, we only discuss this scenario (column 9).
We change the contribution rate for each skill-group separately to reach similar targets, when computed for the
average households within each skill class. Contributions have to be increased 9.2 pp for the low-skilled, 9.7 pp
for the medium-skilled and 9.5 pp for the high-skilled.
27The average pension payouts (over all pillars) increase for the total population and for each skill class. Indeed,
they increase 3% for low-skilled, 7% for medium-skilled and 12% for high-skilled households (not reported in table).
28The flat part as well as the earnings-related part.
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The labor supply incentives are strongest. In spite of population aging, the labor supply remains
as high as in 2013, at 897 yearly hours per capita. As a consequence, output per capita, private
consumption per capita and public consumption per capita also remain essentially unchanged,
when not improving. The increase in labor supply is due to the same reason it increases for
reforms in columns (2) and in columns (7), but cumulates them. Thanks to the increase in labor
supply, social security contributions payments increase. Combined with the pension cuts, the
deficit of the pay-as-you-go pension system disappears, a strong improvement of the financial
sustainability of old-age social security, counteracting the effect of population aging. By design,
the risk of old-age poverty is the same as in the benchmark scenario, average pension payouts
being the same29. The impact of the reform on the net foreign asset position is slightly positive,
as it increases by about 20% of GDP. On the one hand, the increase in labor supply creates
domestic investment opportunities, firms building up their capital stock in the same proportion
as labor supply increases. On the other hand, the introduction of a capital-funded pillar increases
(mandatory) savings. Overall, the increase in domestic firm values V F and total savings A +
AF are comparable, the latter being slightly higher than the former, so that some investment
opportunities are sought abroad.
Overall, the new policy mix with a capital-funded pillar, an increase of the effective retirement
age to its statutory level and a moderate pay-as-you-go pension cuts deliver the best compro-
mise, when evaluated over the four targeted criteria: financial sustainability, output growth
maintenance, protection against old-age poverty risk and current account balance.
6 Transition simulations
In this section we present the full transition path towards final steady states. We focus on the
preferred reform, the introduction of a capital-funded pillar, an increase of the effective retirement
age to its statutory level and a moderate pay-as-you-go pension cut (column 9 in table 2; see
section 5.4). We also consider the two reforms which constitute the main basis for the preferred
reform, namely the introduction of the same capital-funded pillar (column 7) and an identical
increase in retirement age (column 3). The main conclusions from this section can be summarized
informally by:
Summary finding 2: Most of the transition to the new equilibrium, in the final steady state,
takes place over the first 70 years; there are transition costs related to the introduction of the
capital-funded pillar, both in income terms for the old generations and in public finance terms.
Along the transition, we assume a different timing for each (part of the) reform. Increases in
retirement age are linearly phased-in over the first 60 years. In contrast, the introduction of
the capital-funded pillar is effective immediately. The third pillar is still gradually built up over
time, as contributions in the fund accumulate little by little. We will compare an immediate
implementation of the pension cut with a gradual implementation, where the cut is phased-in
linearly over the first 60 years.
29Pension payouts are maintained in average but also across skill classes. Compared to 2013, they increase 0.1%
for low-skilled, 1.1% for medium-skilled and 0.4% for high-skilled households (not reported in table).
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Figure 6.1 confirms our finding on the long run value of net foreign assets. The figure displays
changes of foreign assets in terms of initial GDP, compared to the benchmark case of aging. We
see that a mixture of introducing a capital-funded pillar and increasing the retirement age works
best in order to keep changes of the foreign asset position to a minimum. Using either one of
those two reforms in isolation would lead to a considerable positive or negative change in the
foreign asset holdings, not only on the long run but along the entire transition path.
Figure 6.1: Change of foreign assets in terms of initial GDP
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Note: Changes are measured versus the benchmark scenario of pure aging.
Figure 6.2 shows the relative change of GDP per capita, compared to the aging benchmark
scenario. A clear conclusion is that maintaining output per capita growth in a significant fashion
can only be performed with an increase in the retirement age, as the sole implementation of a
capital-funded pillar hardly outperforms the result of the benchmark aging scenario. The effect
takes place slowly over time, because the retirement age is only increased gradually.
Figure 6.2: Change of GDP per capita in pp
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Note: Changes are measured versus the benchmark scenario of pure aging.
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Figure 6.3 displays the change in average pension benefits, compared to the aging benchmark
scenario. The figure displays the same scenarios as before and an additional one, equivalent to
the preferred scenario (9) but with a phased-in introduction of the pay-as-you-go pension cuts
(10). Recall that pension cuts where applied from the start in scenario (9), with the aim to have
the same effect on average pension benefits over the long run as the benchmark aging scenario.
The first main observation is that average pension benefits drop in the first three decades in
the main scenario (9), because current retirees and older workers suffer from the pay-as-you-go
cuts and do not have the time to accumulate (much) savings in their capital-funded pensions,
as share30 of the 3rd pillar in figure 6.4 confirms. It is a first illustration of the transition costs
of the reform. The sole introduction of the capital-funded pensions (7) also lead to a drop in
average pension benefits, again as the older generations do not have the time to build up (much)
their capital-funded pensions. The drop is however lower, as there is no pension cuts. Over the
long-run, the average pension benefits in this scenario remain lower, since there is no increase in
the retirement age (nor average pensions, through the earnings-related part). The second main
observation in this figure is that the transition costs can be reduced if one uses a different schedule
for the implementation of the reforms. When the pension cuts are only gradually implemented,
as in scenario (10), the transition costs are lower than when they are immediately enforced, as
in scenario (9). It is possible to further minimize these transition costs, if the cuts are delayed
in time.
Figure 6.3: Change average pension benefits in pp
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Note: Changes are measured versus the benchmark scenario of pure aging.
Figure 6.4 plots different variables for the preferred scenario (9) and the related scenario (10)
and illustrates another dimension of transition costs, namely public finance. In this figure, all
curves refer to scenario (9) with one exception. The relative constant development of average
pension payouts and the gradual increase in the share of the third pillar are visible for reform (9).
The third curve plotted is the budget closing instrument for the same reform (9), government
consumption per capita31. We see that, while reform (9) is budget neutral in the long run, there
are high public finance transitional costs: government consumption per capita temporarily has to
30The share is measured as the part of total pension payouts to the households that stems from mandatorily
accumulated pension savings.
31Recall that it is defined exclusive of health and education costs.
28
drop by more than 50%. The reason for such transitional costs is the introduction of the capital-
funded pillar, as contributions into this new pillar come with a decrease in the contributions
in the pay-as-you-go pension pillars (see section 5.3). Because there are less contributions into
these pillars but payments to current retirees are still due, the deficit of the pay-as-you-go pension
system increases at the reform introduction. The drop in government consumption (the budget
closing instrument) finances the deficit. Overtime, as the number of retirees with high pay-as-
you-go earnings-related pension rights drop, the pay-as-you-go pension deficit decreases. The
accumulated fiscal costs from 2014 up to the end of the simulation horizon, 60 years later, are
about 2.6 times the GDP of 2014. Note this evaluation of the public finance cost is a conservative
estimate, as a cut in government consumption is non-distortive and, at such an extent, unrealistic.
Using distortive instruments instead would have negative consequences for the labor supply, the
tax base and tax revenue and would therefore further increase the public finance challenge for the
government. The last curve in the figure plots government consumption per capita for scenario
(10). Recall that it is the same scenario (9) except that the pension cuts are gradually phased-in.
As seen above, the gradual implementation of the pension cut from scenario (10) leads to lower
transition costs for current generations. It comes however with a higher public finance cost,
unsurprisingly, but those are limited. The consumption per capita has to drop more than in
reform (9), but the drop is always less than 60%. The accumulated fiscal costs up from 2014 to
the end of the simulation horizon are about 2.7 times the GDP of 2014, compared to 2.6 times
in scenario (9).
Figure 6.4: Costs of transition to a partially capital-funded system, reforms (9) and (10)
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7 Sensitivity analysis
We perform sensitivity analysis along two axes. The focus is the benchmark aging scenario as
well as the preferred reform and its two main basis (see table 2 and section 5.4), respectively
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scenario (1), reforms (9), (3) and (7). The main conclusions from the sensitivity analysis can be
summarized as follows:
Summary finding 3: The impact of the reforms considered is similar qualitatively and close
quantitatively when the discount factor is smaller or when the hours and participation labor
supply elasticities are smaller; because of a dramatic change in saving behavior and in outcomes
for discount factors larger than one, the use of such discount factors is best avoided, consistent
with the literature and our calibration strategy.
7.1 Discount factor
The main contribution of this paper is the analysis of pension reform using an additional eval-
uation criteria, current account imbalances. In a country which faces a constant interest rate,
saving behavior plays a critical role in defining cross-border investment flows, and thus the cur-
rent account. We thus perform sensitivity analysis with different values for the time discounting
factor β.
In the baseline scenario, the yearly interest rate is r = 0.025 and the discount factor is β = 0.99,
implying relative patience by households: the discount rate ρ = (1 − β)/β ≈ 0.01 is smaller
than the interest rate. We consider two sensitivity cases. First, we use β = 0.97 which implies
ρ ≈ 0.03 > r, such that households are slightly impatient. Second and returning to the discussion
on the calibration of the trade balance (see section 4), we set β in order to replicate the actual
observed trade balance. This implies that β = 1.05 and a negative discount rate ρ = (1−β)/β ≈
−0.05 . Note that in an OLG model β > 1 is an unorthodox choice. However and in contrast
to a Ramsey type model, this value can in principle still be consistent with the existence of a
steady state as agents die before accumulating assets ad infinitum32.
Table 3 presents the simulation results for the aging benchmark scenario and the selected reforms,
all of which result in different outcomes for the baseline value of the discount factor and the two
sensitivity cases. Appendix A provides details for all reforms.
The main difference between β = 0.99 and β = 0.97 already appears in the benchmark aging
scenario: different β lead to different asset holdings of the households, namely +4% versus -74%
of initial GDP. However, conclusions on the effect of reforms remain qualitatively identical and
quantitatively close. Figure 7.1 display the net foreign asset positions for β = 0.97 and the three
reforms considered, to be compared to the baseline case β = 0.99 in figure 6.1. An increase in
retirement age in reform (3) reduces foreign asset holdings by around 80% (β = 0.97) instead of
around 100% (β = 0.99) of initial GDP. As the effect of introducing a capital-funded pillar in
reform (7) are almost identical in both cases, foreign assets are increasing about 20 pp of initial
GDP more with β = 0.97 in the combined reform (9). For a lower discount factor, the policy
reform approach is the same, except a smaller capital-funded pillar is required to neutralize the
effect of aging and retirement age increases on foreign assets.
32What matters for the savings behavior is the difference between the discount rate (defined by the discount
factor) and the interest rate. Sensitivity analysis on the discount factor is thus equivalent to sensitivity analysis
on the capital market return rate.
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For the second sensitivity check β = 1.05 we find extreme and implausible results, net foreign
assets shown in figure 7.2 deviating markedly from the baseline case β = 0.99 in figure 6.1.
This finding provides an additional motivation for our calibration strategy, which ignored the
trade balance currently observed and chose instead a discount factor in line with the literature
(β = 0.99). The increase in retirement age in reform (3) and consequently also the combined
reform (9) first lead to a decrease in foreign assets of almost 15 times the initial GDP, before
increasing twice this magnitude. The pattern as well as the magnitude are implausible. Our
conclusion is that for the research question at hand, a negative discount rate should simply be
avoided.
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Table 3: Sensitivity analysis w.r.t. discount rate - long-run results comparison
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Figure 7.1: Change of foreign assets in terms of initial GDP - β = 0.97
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+6 years (3) +6 years and capital-funded pillar (8) capital-funded pillar (6)
Note: Changes are measured versus the benchmark scenario of pure aging.
Figure 7.2: Change of foreign assets in terms of initial GDP - β = 1.05
-20.0
-15.0
-10.0
-5.0
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
2014 2034 2054 2074 2094 2114 2134 2154 2174 2194 2214 2234 2254
+6 years (3) +6 years and capital-funded pillar (8) capital-funded pillar (6)
Note: Changes are measured versus the benchmark scenario of pure aging.
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7.2 Labor supply elasticities
Households take two types of decisions, related to consumption and related to labor market
activities. The previous section considered the first type of decisions. This section considers
the second type. We compare outcomes in the baseline scenario and in a scenario where the
labor elasticities for hours decisions and for participation decisions are 15% smaller than in the
baseline scenario. Because labor market decisions play a smaller role than savings decisions, we
only consider the selected reforms and the long-run outcomes. Table 4 provides the comparison
of long-run simulations.
With a few exceptions, outcomes are nearly identical. Exceptions are related to the net foreign
asset positions for reforms (3) and (9). Since reform (9) is a combination of reforms (3) and (7),
the exception for reform (9) is a consequence. The net foreign asset position declines more in the
sensitivity analysis case when the retirement age is increased, as in reform (3), for the following
reason. The increase in retirement leads to an exogenous increase in effective labor supply, which
depresses wages and per worker labor supply. Feedback counteracts the effect so that wage rates
stabilize to a moderately higher value. Because wages are bargained and households are less
responsive in the sensitivity analysis case, firms can initially push wages further down, so that
wages and labor costs stabilize at a lower level in the sensitivity analysis case. Labor costs
increase 2.3% instead of 2.4%. Labor supply per worker is thus lower in the sensitivity analysis
case (at 1690 yearly hours, instead of 1691; not reported), GDP per capita grows less (1.5%
instead of 1.7%). Since output is lower, consumption and savings are also lower and the country
relies more on foreign assets to finance investment. Small differences accumulate over time,
explaining why the net foreign asset position in the sensitivity analysis case drops nearly 170%
of GDP, compared to a drop of 95%. Qualitatively however, outcomes in reforms (3) are similar.
To obtain the same quantitative outcomes in reform (9) in the sensitivity analysis case, one can
use the same policy reform approach except with a smaller capital-funded pillar to neutralize
the effect of aging and retirement age increases on foreign assets (similar to the case of a lower
β; see previous section).
34
Table 4: Sensitivity analysis w.r.t. labor supply elasticities - long-run results comparison
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8 Concluding remarks
As is well-known, increasing the retirement age provides the best compromise to ensure the
financial sustainability of pay-as-you-go pension systems with an aging population, maintain
output growth and protect against the risk of old-age poverty. Our analysis shows however that
it comes at a cost, increasing dependence on foreign assets. Indeed, the need to save to finance
consumption after retirement is reduced while the increase in labor supply pushes domestic
investments, pushing up demand on foreign capital. In our baseline scenario with an increase of
the effective retirement age to its statutory level (+ 6 years), Austria would no longer be a net
creditor on the international capital market, holding foreign assets summing up to about 70% of
GDP in 2013, and would become a net debtor over the long run.
We show that the introduction of a capital-funded pillar and small adjustments to the pay-as-
you-go pension system would eliminate the drawback over the long-run. Specifically, with a
capital-funded pillar replacing about 25% of the pay-as-you-go pension pillars, and moderate
pension cuts so that the average total pension payment is the same as in a status quo case,
added to the increase of the effective retirement age to its statutory level, Austria would remain
a net creditor on the international capital market. The main reason is that the contributions to
the capital-funded pillars are savings and can be use to satisfy domestic investment demand.
Consistent with the literature, we also find that such a reform would have costs over the short-
run, in particular because the partial shift of contributions from the pay-as-you-go to the capital-
funded pillars would decrease the financing of the current pay-as-you-go pension system. From
a policy perspective, our analysis does not eliminate any such hurdle associated with the intro-
duction of a pre-funded element in the pension system. However, it shows that there can be
additional benefits.
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A Appendix: details for different discount factors
Table 5: Long-run results - β = 0.97
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Table 6: Long-run results - β = 1.05
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